"Money remittance is a simple payment service"
- Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market

On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 at 08:33, Spremljanje Reklamacij <
Spremljanje.Reklamacij[at]unicreditgroup.si> wrote:

Dear Mr. Bohan Julian,


In the Complaints Monitoring Department, we received your email in which you requested an explanation of the cost breakdown for the foreign payment made on 6th September 2023, in the amount of EUR 116.75, to the recipient Best Electronics. We appreciate your message and below is our response:


UniCredit Banka Slovenija d.d. (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) executed the foreign payment in the full amount of EUR 116.75. Additionally, an outbound commission fee of EUR 0.42 was subsequently applied, in accordance with the Bank's tariff.


Since this was a transaction in Germany, the transfer was carried out through intermediary bank, which deducted EUR 10 for order execution. Please note that the Bank does not have information on the recipient's charges or any intermediary bank charges, so we regretfully cannot provide you with that information in advance.


Best regards,


UniCredit Banka Slovenija d.d.

Customer Contact Center and Support

Complaints Monitoring

Dear Unicredit Slovenija Bank and various hidden onlookers

Picture this. You are in Slovenia. You want to buy computer bits from Germany for €116,75, using your Unicredit Slovenija bank account.


How much should you send? The answer, you might think, is an obvious €116,75. Any fees for sending the money will be deducted separately from your account.


Wrong. This is Slovenia. The correct answer is €116,75 + guess the amount.


The amount you have to guess is the sum which will be stolen from your €116,75 en route to your vendor.


But Unicredit don't know anything about this and it is nothing to do with them. Clear now?


The whole of this story is that on 6 Sep 2023 I sent €116,75 via SWIFT from Unicredit Slovenija to Best Electronics in Germany and they only received €106,75. Unicredit eventually admitted in an email 9 Oct 2023 that €10 was deducted by an "intermediary bank" and are doing that shrugging thing.



Shrugging (​optionally accompanied by an impatient or helpless look) is a vital part of Slovenian culture and the endpoint of many confrontations between its innumerable legal utopias and the gritty reality.

The first baker's dozen of problems with Unicredit's shrugging argument (see the email above) are as follows:

1. Unicredit Slovenija is behaving like a slippery eel as usual. Article 214 of applicable law ZPLaSSIED suggests "The payment system operator shall ensure strength, clarity, transparency and enforceability of the legal basis of the payment system in all segments of the acquis and for all relevant aspects of the activities of this payment system."


I contend arrival of the right amount of money is a relevant aspect.

2. Unicredit is admitting quite positively that it only succeeded in sending 91.43% of the payment due.

3. About that transparency and clarity. Having deducted €116,75 from my account, plus a 42 cent fee, Unicredit never told me that a payment of €116,75 could not be made.


This was what it contracted to do when it debited my account. It did not contract to make €106,75 arrive.


It did not contract to get rid of any of the €116,75 or share it out among its different front companies, but to pay €116,75 to the payee.


But Unicredit has sat on its hands and claims that from the instant my €116,75 departed, it is not even in a position to know if the transfer to its own sister bank across the Alps did not succeed as its client(s) intended.


What Unicredit did do was to try to create a false dichotomy between the money's departure and its arrival, as though the two were not connected and its obligations ended with the former.


Funniest of all, Unicredit in Ptuj has tried to pretend recipient bank Hypovereinsbank is a far away thing of which it knows nothing.


In fact Unicredit got its first big break in banking when it bought Hypovereinsbank in 1869 - now Unicredit AG.


About the legal enforceability, Unicredit's attitude is that an investigation of my missing ten or twenty or more tens of euros would not be worth the amount involved, and makes us look bad. 

Know what? That's because you are bad.


The great Slovenian shrugging scenario is key to configuring an end-to-end solution. Why would Unicredit think or decide I wanted to send €106,75 and not the right amount? Shrugging.


Where and when were the parties and particularly the payer informed it was all going wrong? Never. Shrugging.


Who is this other company you claim is responsible for the €10 charge? Shrugging.


How come I knew nothing about this until the goods didn't arrive? What did you do? Shrugging.


For all of the above I got charged €10,42. Why? Shrugging.


4. So there was a hidden charge. Hidden, we are meant to believe, not just from the payer, but from Unicredit and the payee too. But not only this! The additional €10 to pay it has been taken from the money expected by the payee.


Slovenians can rejoice, as both non-Slovenian sellers, and buyers on foreign markets where goods can be seven times cheaper than in Slovenia can be super-inconvenienced by Unicredit's inability and failure to predict any such deduction. Thanks to Unicredit Slovenija, no one knows what's going on. Each thinks the other, or one of their banks, is trying to rip him off.


Time and money are wasted in a multiplicative fashion.


The customer is entitled to a noticeable warning about all the costs in advance.


Instead the banking system has masterfully combined an unlawfully concealed irregular fee with an added cost for screwing everything up.


There's a chance of multiplying the event, turning one transfer into two or three. 


But it's not just my €10 that's gone missing, is it? Surely this must happen to every comparable transaction?


5. It would be manifestly chaotic and inefficient for Payment Service Providers (PSPs) to unexpectedly deduct money from every such payment.


By doing so, Unicredit is like an arsonist, setting fires with every transfer, with everyone blaming each other for an incomprehensible, annoying and difficult to trace error in the payment amount.


A myriad problems would be generated requiring, er, more bank transactions.


6. Oh but it was this other bank - an intermediary, Unicredit say.


And Unicredit don't know who that is, they say.


But I did not ask Unicredit to send my €116,75 to an intermediary whose whereabouts are unknown.


I did however state on Unicredit's web form that I wanted it sent to HYVEDEMM448.


7. No prior warning about any intermediary or its costs, whether foreign or domestic, were apparent during the transaction. 

CSMs don't want to deal with me, nor I with them.


8. Multiple charges were placed on a single transaction, which portrayed a cost 25 times lower than the charge ultimately exacted - for a non-useful result!


No receipt was issued for the charge to the payer.


9. The cost of the transaction was misrepresented. 42 cents is bad enough ("It's free if you pay online", Unicredit purred early on). The cost of the first attempt proved (according to the bank's belated claim) to be €10,42 plus all the hassle and confusion of further communications with the bank and between myself and Best Electronics. 


10. So basically Unicredit Slovenija's plan is to cause hassle and confusion in every single cross-border transaction involving money going to not-Slovenian people.


Every such payment will arrive €10 short, siphoning off funds to support Hamas or Putin, but actually probably siphoned straight up the nose of some creep in Ljubljana.


But that is a matter entirely between Unicredit and him, as my domestic charges have already been supposedly contained by Unicredit Slovenija's outrageous 42 cent fee for three seconds' computing, and by its statement "Domači stroški plačniku, tuji stroški prejemniku". As you can see in the attached screenshot.




11. On the other hand, "Since this was a transaction in Germany" and since Germany is not part of Slovenia, it falls under the "foreign" category mentioned here. "Domači stroški plačniku, tuji stroški prejemniku" it says (again). 


As for where the money disappears to, it is beyond credibility that Unicredit has "no information". Having information about where money comes from and goes to is why banks exist. If you want a bank that doesn't have this information, Unicredit Slovenija is the one for you!


12. If Unicredit did not know "in advance" who its intermediary was (afterwards), how could it have known where to send them the money, for them to send to Unicredit's other bank in Rosenheim?


If Unicredit does not know "in advance" who its intermediary is, how can it know its fee? If Unicredit cannot tell you its fee "in advance", how will you know how much extra to add to your payment, to ensure the correct payment will arrive at the other end of the transfer?


13. Unicredit said it would be 42 cents, that foreign charges were to be met by the payee.


But I was charged nearly 25 times more, for which Unicredit is having a go at blaming foreigners. Or is it? We do not know, as Unicredit Slovenija says it does not know through whom it transferred the €116,75 to Unicredit AG, so the customer cannot find out if they are foreign or not. So, so transparent.


A systemic ripoff contrary to EU banking principles, defective in operation, involving discrimination between Member States, and perpetrated by the contractor Unicredit Slovenija upon the rightfully suspicious Slovenian banking customer and eurozone dweller, is therefore exposed.




As Unicredit may be able to see, I have now sent the "unpaid" €10 deducted by this unwelcome intermediary to Best Electronics. Again.


According to experience, this second €10 should completely disappear, in the performance of a transfer which, as a consequence of its architecture, will never take place. I'm enclosing a screenshot of this second transaction for anyone who's interested.


But on 10 October Best Electronics received my €10, so we can add inconsistency to Unicredit's "charging methodology" rap sheet.


Meanwhile I am not getting my computers upgraded, so I'm going to anyone who will listen to reclaim my twenty euros and compensation for loss of all the computing power I need to keep up with these self-defeating scams.


First in line is the Bank of Slovenia complaint service, which like all consumer-facing assistance in Slovenia looks really helpful, official, and just the ticket. Until you press "send" and it doesn't work. In this way the Slovenian banking industry has automated the shrugging process.




To not warn about a charge is bad enough, but to just snatch it out of a transaction between two counterparties is a ludicrously amateurish performance, designed to ruin things. What if I sent only nine euros?


The dubious idea Unicredit is floating here is that the outcome of a bank transfer is unpredictable, and that the intermediary's €10 charge is a "surprise".


And sadly for the Slovenian bank's shrugtastic theory that all its responsibilities ended on debit day, a reminder from Directive 2007/64/EC:


"The payer's payment service provider should assume liability for correct payment execution, including, in particular the full amount of the payment transaction and execution time, and full responsibility for any failure by other parties in the payment chain up to the account of the payee."


Fortunately there is an organisation overseeing PSPs who have rules to keep things running smoothly, the way non-Slovenians expect. If the contract to send €116,75 cannot be accurately fulfilled, the transaction should become an "R-transaction", rather than Unicredit doing a giant smelly dump on people's attempts to buy and sell stuff.


Says the European Payments Council


"A 'Return' occurs when a credit transfer is diverted from normal execution after interbank Settlement, and is sent by the Beneficiary Bank to the Originator Bank for a credit transfer that cannot be executed for valid reasons such as wrong account number or account closed with the consequence that the Beneficiary account cannot be credited on the basis of the information contained in the original credit transfer message."


Alas if Unicredit knew anything about money, it would be that money talks. And it mostly says goodbye. A deal to send €1 is a deal to send €1, not €1 or -€9.


Therefore I am asking Unicredit to pay the amount properly. 


I am asking Unicredit to ensure the transfer of the €10 goes through to Best Electronics without any intermediary charge made without due warning. 


I am asking Unicredit to return any €10 I was not expecting to pay. 


I am asking Unicredit to identify the intermediaries Unicredit Slovenija uses to transfer money to Unicredit AG, an entity about which Unicredit claims to know nothing.


I am asking Unicredit to explicitly display all applicable fees on its internet banking such that the true cost can be evaluated before a transfer.


I'm asking Unicredit to not contract with CSMs to a situation where fees can be deducted from payments in transfer to the detriment of the parties, but to try the sensible and EPC-authorised methodology instead.


As Unicredit will probably be aware, 

"In the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, payment services can be provided by payment service providers, which are: (i) banks, (ii) companies for issuing electronic money, (iii) companies for issuing electronic money with waiver, (iv) payment institutions, (v) payment institutions with a waiver, (vi) service providers providing account information (vii) Bank of Slovenia, (viii) Administration of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Payments and other state bodies and bodies of self-governing local communities in the Republic of Slovenia .

"Banks, companies issuing electronic money, payment institutions and payment institutions with a waiver based in the Republic of Slovenia must obtain the appropriate permission from the Bank of Slovenia to provide payment services in accordance with the Banking Act or the Act on Payment Services, Electronic Money Issuing Services and Payment Systems. Account information service providers can provide services after prior registration with the Bank of Slovenia."



Perhaps Unicredit can choose retrospectively who its intermediary was, to get into the best legal position to not give me my €10 back. But I don't see how that saves Unicredit from Articles 14 (paras. 1-4), 23(1), 23(4(3)), 23(7), 23(9), 23(14), 23(15), 23(16), 23(18), 23(20), 32, 50(1), 50(4(3)), 51(5), 51(9), or 149(1(2)) of ZvPOT-1. Articles 108, 211(3), 221, 228, 237, 240(4), 306 of KZ-1 are interesting, while from Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 we learn:


"The creation of an integrated market for electronic payments in euro, with no distinction between national and cross-border payments is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market."


A necessity in stark contrast to that of this spiv intermediary, be he domestic or foreign, who has had away with my €10.


Please also note Article 9 ibid.


This somewhat destroys Unicredit Slovenija's thinly disguised prejudice against "foreign" payments. Alas, even the European Payments Council does not seem to be on Unicredit's side, with


"The remittance data supplied by the Originator in the Credit Transfer Instruction must be forwarded in full and without alteration by the Originator Bank and any intermediary institution and CSM to the Beneficiary Bank.​.​..The Beneficiary Bank must also deliver received remittance data in full and without alteration to the Beneficiary."


But Unicredit did alter and is altering, and did not deliver and is not delivering the remittance data without alteration to the Beneficiary.


A distinction was made between national and international transfers.


Its pricing was not legally displayed.


No receipt was issued by the unknown intermediary to the person footing the bill.


 Unicredit in its contractual relations does not adhere to the Four Corners Model, and its actions did not, "as a minimum, cover elements relevant to the execution of a credit transfer"


Their agent did not return the funds when it failed to find that the Beneficiary account c​ould not "be credited on the basis of the information contained in the original credit transfer message.​"


​In case you are dozing off from all the shrugging, the information referred to here is my desire to send Best Electronics €116,75. 


See also their 3.4.


Then there's Recommendation 5 of the ERPB working group on transparency for retail payment end-users​, which suggests PSPs​:


"Use standards and applications suitable for including identified data sets 'end-to-end'. Upgrade or change these standards when necessary.​"


Clearers and settlers have limited options: see 4.3.1, showing there were three opportunities to reject the incorrect transfer, on the basis of "Yes I can transfer €116,75" or "No I can't transfer €116,75".


But these CSMs have decided to add a third operation of their own, i.e. make up a completely different and inappropriate transfer, for €106,75. So they can keep 8.57% of my cash. 


But that's not how it's supposed to be. Unicredit has teamed up with a criminal. You can see how it is supposed to be in Figure 2.


"Participants are free to choose between operating processes themselves or using intermediaries or outsourcing (partially or completely) to third parties. However, outsourcing or the use of intermediaries does not relieve Participants of the responsibilities defined in the Rulebook.​"


As SWIFT sees things, it is ready to "Eliminate payments friction with upfront account verification":


"Before sending a payment, banks can check the validity of the beneficiary account by comparing it against our vast library of transaction data – that’s over 9 billion payments travelling between 4 billion accounts every single year."


I'm also liking


"It is essential, for the fully integrated straight-through processing of payments and for legal certainty with respect to the fulfilment of any underlying obligation between payment service users, that the full amount transferred by the payer should be credited to the account of the payee. Accordingly, it should not be possible for any of the intermediaries involved in the execution of payment transactions to make deductions from the amount transferred."


And who could forget


"It should be possible for the payment service provider to specify unambiguously the information required to execute a payment order correctly."


While intermediaries should


"Be transparent to the Scheme and in no way affect or modify the obligations of the Participants."


Twice is not an accident or coincidence, and so in the interests of the transparency recommended by Article 4 of 260/2012, when Unicredit finds out who its business partner is for transferring money to Germany, I am asking it to also reveal to which of the above categories (i) to (viii) this sepulchral entity belongs.


It looks like Unicredit's fine will be limited to €125,000 under Article 318 supra. Per instance, I hope. There's no need to worry, as in my case it can just lend itself €125,000 and then not pay itself back.


I hereby grant the recipients of this email the right to examine all data they might consider not examining using data protection as an excuse.


Instead of seeing customers, and particularly international ones, as cows to be milked, Unicredit would do well to explain why they are so good at sneaky tricks, but not competent enough investors to pay decent interest rates or operate a predictable payment service. For these prices I'd expect a luxury service, not these lies and this shrug-show.


Presently, Unicredit's assertions are not worth the pixels they are printed on!​ As it may rely on XI 7 of its T&C, I shall rely on the obligations it does have, as enumerated above, which taken together appear sufficient to prosecute ex officio.


XI 2, as you can see, rests on regulation binding the intermediary or third person involved​, which includes of course the Four Corners Model, showing payers and payees have no interaction with Clearing and Settlement Mechanisms, and therefore cannot be billed by them - with or without a warning on Day D or an invoice afterwards. And certainly not out of the transfer itself. And y'know:


"...it is essential that the processing of credit transfers and direct debits is not hindered by business rules or technical obstacles such as compulsory adherence to more than one system for settling cross-border payments.​"


​Which I will argue​ outranks Unicredit's claims of a right to irresponsibility. 


​Meanwhile at other banks, the EU was frequently mentioned in the context of cheap transfers with no intermediaries, with Delavska Hranilnica offering to wire €​116,75 to Best Electronics' bank for €​2,30 all in, and swanky bank NLB coming in at €​5, rising to €​9 for non-EU Switzerland, still cheaper than Unicredit for EU euro transfers - even for non-customers.


For the edification of fellow victims these emails are published at www.aaa.si/unicredible


Lep Pozdrav



Julian Bohan





To the Minister of Finance, 12 October 2023

Dear Klemen

Dealing with the problem of banks shrugging about money being stolen from customers in irregular banking practices in Slovenia, I was drawn to the seemingly helpful site of the Bank of Slovenia, which invited me to send it a complaint. 

I was pleasantly surprised, as Slovenia comes across as a very anti-complaint culture. 

I did so, but https://vsebina.bsi.si/PUFS wouldn't send. So I emailed the complaint to pr@bsi.si instead and asked for a reference number. 

Unfortunately, and due perhaps to the failed automation or shrugging, the Bank of Slovenia has not got back to me.

Being ignored doesn't facilitate the complaint process, and I wonder if they are genuine. 

It's starting to look like they are anti-complaint after all. No complaint can officially exist without a number, and there is not much point to a complaint with no response. So by the sheer power of inactivity the Bank of Slovenia is implying we have no complaints.

My feeling is that the Bank of Slovenia may have only expressed an interest in banking complaints to meet some EU diktat requiring them to be complaint compliant. 

They can point to it and say "Look look, we're doing it" - rather than actually doing it, which is my usual experience of these things in Slovenia.

Of course the EU inspector of complaint-compliance would not actually have a complaint and would never fill in or try to send the form. 

So they would never find out that the Bank of Slovenia's professed interest in our complaints is a sham. 

And if it can't get the computing right for a complaint form, what are its chances with counting money and so on? 

Perhaps it worked once, and this can all be traced back to the discovery in some office, when it broke, that life was a lot easier after that. 

Please encourage them to make the anti-complaint complaints system accept and respond to complaints, and to send me the complaint number for mine, which you can see at www.aaa.si/unicredible.  

Thank you for your attention to this matter.


Julian Bohan


Notes on online dispute resolution.

Notes on data protection.


Every hour, thousands in unearned fees are generated in Slovenia by shrugging. The victims are those who cannot be bothered to argue the toss.

The power of shrugging ensures Slovenia's banking economy is carried on the shoulders of angry-customer-facing personnel, with shrugging contributions from lawyers and consumer protection services, all the way up to the highly trained professional shrugs of policemen, financial inspectors, data protection officials, ombudsmen, and political operators.

Experience suggests one shrug at the branch level is worth ~2 euros, with ~5 shrugs required to steal €10. But the value per shrug to the bankers will steadily diminish if further layers of shrugging are added during the dispute phase, even as sunk cost error and -  paradoxically - the profit motive encourage ever harder shrugging.

The SWIFT system is being abused. And shrugging in Slovenia is key to this.

Charges for transfers between Unicredit and Unicredit are not taking place as lawfully intended, requiring remedial transactions.

Customers are being charged for no reason, for something Unicredit has no problem doing for 42 cents, and for which the costs are substantially the same, when the payee is in Slovenia.

It is hard to get Slovenians to join the War on Shrugs, as shrugging is part of a culture of treating people like downtrodden suckers.

In this it is easier for the victims to acquiesce to discrimination against themselves, as it is considered socially embarrassing to kick up a stink.

Those who choose to focus on the "type" of complainants, or reply with accusations that these are degrading Slovenian business, its regulation, or Slovenia generally, are simply seeking to distract from the substantive issue of Unicredit stealing their money.

As such they are complicit in their own (generalised) reputation.

Without shrugging, the economy would have to work according to European and national laws suggesting that bank customers should not be charged €10 for a SWIFT transfer, or differently than for national transfers - and not charged at all by intermediaries - except by prior agreement and fair warning.

Neither are part of Unicredit's plan which its staff don't know it has.

To avoid simple checks of its own data, Unicredit has chosen to insert an unknown extra company or companies, creating an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy, slowness, data protection risk, inefficiency, and cost, in order to generate this charge. For reasons unknown to themselves, to regulators, to their service users, or to you.

Perhaps these reasons will become clear when we find out who and what the intermediaries and their relationships are.

But there is a lot of shrugging to be done before that can happen.

Those shrugging that a pathetic €10 is not worth bothering about are reminded of the many far more essential items they buy priced at less than €10.

Those in finance who are still not convinced, who think €10 is nothing, and are still shrugging about it, are invited to send me their own €10.

It might arrive.


18 October 2023

Dear Mr. Bohan,

thank you for your email. We are sorry that you had problems with our new channel for complaints. We would like to explain that we have successfully received several complaints and you are the first reporting to us with this kind of problem. We will look into it.

Notwithstanding the above, we can confirm receiving your complaint via email. It is under the review with our professional services and we will get back to you as soon as possible.

Kind regards,

BANKA SLOVENIJE Evrosistem | E: pr@bsi.si



2 November 2023

Dear Mr. Bohan Julian,

In the Complaints Monitoring Department, we received your email in which you requested an explanation for the foreign payment made on 9th October 2023, in the amount of EUR 10, to the recipient Best Electronics. We appreciate your message and below is our response:

UniCredit Banka Slovenija d.d. (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) executed the foreign payment in the full amount of EUR 10. Additionally, an outbound commission fee of EUR 0.42 was subsequently applied, in accordance with the Bank's tariff.

Again, this was a transaction to Germany, but in this case, our foreign payment made a manual correction of the payment order, so the transfer was not carried out through intermediary bank, which would again deducted EUR 10 for order execution as in the first case, when you made the foreign payment on 6th September 2023 in the amount of EUR 116.75.

We kindly ask you that in case, you will be making another payment order to Germany, enter the IBAN number of receiver and not routing number.

Best regards,

UniCredit Banka Slovenija d.d.

Customer Contact Center and Support

Complaints Monitoring

2 November 2023

Dear Unicredit

Thank you for your email, which has been added to www.aaa.si/unicredible for reference purposes. 

Having never even heard of routing numbers until today, I am however accustomed to using IBAN numbers and SWIFT numbers. I recall your internet banking likes to have both.

Intrigued by your squirming, I turned to the internet. "Routing numbers are used only on US accounts," says 

Maybe that explains why I've never heard of routing numbers. In my simpleminded way, I would expect Slovenian internet banking to refuse to accept a number for a transfer to Germany that is not used in Europe. 

If what you say is correct, why didn't it refuse to accept it? 

Do you mean the SWIFT number? They are not the same thing. Unfortunately for your attempt to rectify events in your favour by heaping unannounced responsibilities upon the customer, "Germany has an 8-digit routing code", according to Wikipedia. 
So is moneytransfers.com wrong?

Where on the transfer application is the 8-digit number to which you refer? 

I attach a screenshot of a recent payment where an IBAN was used, but no IBAN appears in the record of any such payment. This makes your response suspiciously convenient. But legally, it doesn't make any difference to your position.

The fee was deducted out of the transfer, contrary to the abovementioned regulatory requirements of https://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/sites/default/files/KB/files/item%201%20EPC125-05%20SCT%20RB%20v7.2%20approved.pdf and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:094:0022:0037:en:PDF and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32007L0064 and the Four Corners Model. 

The complaint remains unresolved. 

There was no warning of a fee in advance for allegedly not providing Best Electronics' IBAN, which is DE 96 7112 0077 0363 8614 15, and no receipt was issued, per the aforementioned Slovenian statute ZvPOT-1. 

Also you do not mention that transfers accompanied by the instruction "All Unicredits, do not steal this" are exempt from the fee (see foregoing).

As you know, if you personally drop ten euros you don't forget about it and leave it on the ground. Perhaps you have a personal minimum for which you do not consider it worth bending over. Here, you attempt to make valid a charge made lacking warning or a receipt, by placing fault with the customer.

But here Slovenia's empathy is revealed in all its typical non-existence.

The customer would not choose a method designed to cost him more - whether the entity issuing the bill is Slovenian or foreign. Yet you are implying I did.

Speaking of which, who are they, and which is it? And where is this secret intermediary registered - America?

Basically the customer should not be able to make a mistake. If, due the faulty design of your system, I did (which I dispute) it's still Unicredit's fault, whether the ten euros has been misappropriated by accident or design. 

You can fool some of the people all of the time, and you can fool all of the people some of the time. But you can't fool all of the people all of the time. Perhaps it is time to ban non-Slovenian customers, since you find foreign things so distinctly and institutionally troubling. If you think getting my name backwards adds to your credibility for accuracy, think again.

Which number do you call a routing number?

Where's my ten euros?


Julian Bohan

For the latest ex officio action see here.